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Exchanging Delayed Social Security Benefits for Lump Sums:
Could This Incentivize Longer Work Careers?
Jingjing Chai, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla

Deciding when to retire and claim Social Security benefits is one of the most
important financial decisions that people make. Traditionally, claiming triggers the beginning
of a lifelong annuity payment. Yet if workers who delayed claiming were offered a lump sum
instead of an actuarially-adjusted deferred annuity, it is possible that at least some would
decide to work longer. This paper models the factors that influence whether individuals would
be willing to trade off delayed Social Security benefits in exchange for a lump sum.
Additionally, we examine the consequences of providing a lump sum reward in lieu of an
actuarially-adjusted annuity for work, retirement, and life cycle wellbeing.
Economic theory suggests that retirees value lifelong income benefit streams that
protect them from running out of money in old age (Yaari 1965; Davidoff et al. 2005;
Mitchell et al. 1999). An implication of the theory is that most risk-averse individuals would
be expected to hold a substantial portion of their portfolios in annuitized assets. Nevertheless,
empirical evidence suggests that many people value lump sum payouts over lifelong benefit
streams (Brown et al. 2008; Warner and Pleeter 2001). We explore these key outcomes by
developing and implementing a realistically-calibrated life cycle model for forward looking
rational agents with endogenous labor supply, saving, investment, and retirement decisions,
that allows for time-varying investment opportunity sets and risky labor income.
The goal of this research is to evaluate whether this potential approach to Social
Security reform would induce workers to retire later on a voluntary basis. We find that such a
policy has the potential to increase retirement ages substantially, with little or no decline in
welfare. Three factors help explain why the lump sum reward for deferred retirement can
induce more work while not decreasing lifetime utility. First, many people would prefer to
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have a lump sum rather than an addition to their lifetime Social Security benefit, as this
affords them flexibility over the timing of their consumption and leisure decisions. A second
reason is liquidity driven: that is, if people desire to leave a stock of assets to their heirs,
having a lump sum enhances this possibility. And third, financially sophisticated individuals
able to participate in the equity market will find attractive the opportunity to invest some of
their lump sum amounts.
Policymakers seeking ways to reform the Social Security system may be interested in
our findings, since the actuarially fair lump sum for delayed retirement does induce some
individuals to work longer voluntarily. In our base case, workers given the chance to receive
their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum payment would boost their average retirement
age by 1.5-2 years. Moreover, when the reform is implemented, this boosts the probability of
working beyond the normal retirement age from 29% to 86% for the young, and from 4% to
49% for 60-year olds. Results vary, of course, across individuals of different types: the effect
is even larger for less risk-averse older households, while the most risk-averse respond least.
Financially unsophisticated households (i.e. those who lack access to the equity market) are
also relatively unresponsive to the lump sum option; even here, though, the less risk-averse
still tend to work longer and retire later. Moreover, we show that such a lump sum policy
would generally not detract from wellbeing: in the base case, young workers typically have
virtually no change in lifetime utility, whereas older individuals gain slightly. Among the less
financially sophisticated, both the young and the old experience little change.
It is worth noting that offering a lump sum equivalent in expected present value to the
delayed retirement credit would be cost-neutral to the system, on average. Additionally, if
older individuals worked longer voluntarily, this could enhance system solvency via
additional payroll tax collections.

3

Prior Studies
This paper contributes to the research examining the effects of Social Security policies
on labor supply.1 A number of studies in the portfolio choice literature have investigated how
individuals might alter their work, investment, annuitization, and retirement decisions in
response to change in Social Security benefits assuming a parameterization similar to that in
the US Social Security system.2 Yet these analyses have not examined optimal household life
cycle behavior with flexible work hours and retirement, to assess what might happen if people
were afforded the opportunity to take part of their Social Security benefits as a lump sum
instead of as a benefit flow.
Experimental research and survey evidence has suggested that a majority of workers
would favor lump-sum payments over lifetime benefits, if these were approximately
actuarially equivalent. Furthermore, there is some modest price sensitivity associated with this
preference (Brown et al. 2008, 2011). Orszag (2001) discussed some important institutional
design aspects of Social Security (e.g. computation of present values, spousal/widow benefits)
and offered comments on how lump sum benefits might replace the delayed retirement
(annuity) credit. His work provided some preliminary evidence that claiming probabilities
could rise in response. Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) reported that for 80 percent of their
survey respondents, a lump-sum payment instead of an increase in annual benefit amounts
due to delayed claiming would provide an incentive to claim later. Nevertheless, those studies
focus specifically on the claiming decision (and how these decisions are framed), but they
abstract from other important factors including preferences (risk aversion, leisure,
impatience), the state of the business cycle, uncertainty with respect to labor income and
capital markets, asset allocation, household saving, and health status. Most importantly, they
assume that the claiming decision is independent of labor force participation. Therefore that
1

See Feldstein and Leibman (2002) for a review, and most recently, Laitner and Silverman (2012).
See Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008), Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) and Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and
Rogalla (2012).
2
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research is silent on the likely impact of such lump-sum options on work hours, retirement
ages, saving, and household wellbeing. Moreover, offering such lump-sums could potentially
induce workers to delay retirement and claiming of Social Security benefits, which could
enhance system sustainability. There has been no theoretical research on this topic to date.

Methodology
Our prior work on which we build this study developed, implemented, and calibrated a
realistic discrete time life cycle model of endogenous work hours, retirement behavior,
consumption, saving, and portfolio choice (c.f. Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2012).
Allowing for uninsurable labor income risk and capital market risk, this model incorporates
individual risk aversion, time preferences, and leisure preferences, as well as borrowing
constraint, and uncertain length of life. Preferences in each period are characterized by an isoelastic and time-separable power utility function defined over a composite good consisting of
consumption Ct and leisure Lt at time t, and wealth Qt bequeathed to the next generation.
As is conventional in the theoretical literature, the relative importance of leisure and
consumption is valued using a modified Cobb-Douglas function, which ensures that the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to one. The value function
is given by:
Vt 
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the subjective probability of surviving to time t + 1, given the consumer is alive at t. The
parameter is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  is the rate of time preference.
Leisure preferences are governed by the parameter α. The strength of the bequest motive is
controlled by the parameter b. In each period, the individual must decide how much to work,
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consume, and invest in the capital market. Also the worker must decide when to retire and
claim Social Security benefits. This problem is solved through backward induction of the
value function. The optimal policies are then evaluated by conducting a Monte Carlo
simulation (for further details see Appendix A). For the base case worker, preference
parameters are set as follows: coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ = 5, discount factor β =
0.97, leisure preference value  = 1.3, and bequest strength b = 0. The one-period survival
rates pt are taken from the US 2000 population mortality table for females.3 In additional
sensitivity analysis we vary preference parameters.
The stock and labor market processes are governed by a “regime-switching” process
for the business cycle. Asset returns are characterized by either a ‘normal’ capital market
(with low volatility/high expected returns) or a ‘crisis’ scenario (with high volatility/low
expected returns). The deterministic component of the wage rate process and the labor income
shock process follows Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2012). Housing-related
expenditures are estimated using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (as described in
Appendix B).
We also implement a realistic approach to determining Social Security benefits, where
the worker may claim a benefit between the early retirement age (ERA) of 62 and the late
retirement age (LRA) of 70. If the worker claims prior to her normal retirement age (NRA),
she receives a permanently lower benefit for life; if she claims later, her Social Security
benefit payment is increased by the delayed retirement credit. For our alternative scenario, we
examine how retirement behavior would change if the individual could take a part of her
Social Security benefits as a lump sum payment, by working beyond the NRA. This lump
sum payment would be equal, in present value terms, to the additional benefit stream paid to
the worker claiming Social Security benefits after the NRA.
3

Using a similar model framework; Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) show that these parameter
values replicate several empirical facts including the hump-shaped pattern of work hours, the two peaks in
retirement rates, and the sizeable decline in consumption at retirement.
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Several factors might be anticipated to lead people to favor a lump sum over an
annuity stream. For instance, people might wish to leave a bequest, have a higher or lower
discount rate, value leisure strongly, or be very risk-averse. Other influences could include
changes in the retirement system such as a lower replacement rate and a higher normal
retirement age. We also explore how financial sophistication might shape peoples’ responses
to the Social Security lump sum option versus the annuity. This takes into account the finding
that many Americans lack knowledge of and easy access to sophisticated financial
instruments such as equities (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Gomes and Michaelides 2005).4
Additionally we provide a welfare analysis which evaluates the extent to which the ability to
convert deferred Social Security benefits into a lump sum can enhance worker wellbeing.
In what follows, we present results for individuals initially observed at age 20, and
separately at age 60. This allows us to explore the likely behavioral responses of older versus
younger workers. We present two sets of results: in the base case, workers have access to the
stock and the bond market, which we deem the financially sophisticated group. In an
alternative scenario, the analysis assumes that individuals can hold only bonds paying a safe
return, but they have no access to equities. The model assumes that 20-year olds hold no
initial wealth. For 60-year olds, we estimate distributions of income and wealth-to-income
ratios using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for single female households.5 To this
end, we first group all households initially aged 60 into two categories: stockholders and nonstockholders. Then, within each household category, we drop the lower and upper labor
income quartiles (to avoid data outliers). Hence, there are 50 labor income percentiles left (i.e.
the 25th -74th percentile).6 In order to specify distinct combinations of wealth-to-income ratios

4

Using a dataset on Swedish investors, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) find empirical evidence that the
share of risky assets held by households is strongly positively correlated with an index for financial
sophistication.
5
The HRS (here we use waves one to ten) is a longitudinal panel study which surveys a representative sample of
over 26,000 respondents age 50+ every two years; see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/.
6
This procedure generates wealth-to-income-ratios for stockholders (non-stockholders) with a mean value of
3.76 (1.31), and a standard-deviation of 1.7 (0.75).
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and labor income percentiles, we estimate average wealth-to-income ratios for each of the 50
income percentiles. We then simulate 10,000 life cycle paths for every combination of wealthto-income ratios and income quantiles using optimal feedback controls obtained from the
numerical optimization model. All results are reported as the average of 50,000 paths (i.e.
50 10,000).

Results
Under the Social Security system’s current rules, a worker who delays claiming her
benefit until after the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is entitled to a benefit increase of about
8% per year that retirement is deferred.7 In our model, under an actuarially fair lump sum
scheme, an individual who opted to work to age 66 instead of claiming benefits at age 65
would then receive a lump sum worth of about 1.2 times her age-65 benefit, plus the age-65
benefit stream for life. Similarly, an individual deferring retirement even later, to age 70,
would receive a lump sum worth about 6 times the starting-age annual benefit payment, plus
the age-65 benefit stream for life (see Appendix A for details).
Results for the Base Case
To illustrate how our life cycle model works, we refer to the base case results in
Figure 1. Average consumption increases with age in the top panel, since workers are not able
to borrow against future labor income. Consistent with empirical evidence,8 consumption
drops sharply around the retirement age and continues to decrease thereafter. The model also
generates a relatively realistic work hours profile by age, as reported in the second panel.

7

The Social Security delayed retirement credit of 8% per year’s delay was intended to be actuarially fair at the
time the law was passed; this was consistent with average mortality tables at the time, as well as a 2.9% real
assumed interest rate. In this paper we assume a real interest rate of 2%, a rate more consistent with the current
low interest rate regime. As Shoven and Slavov (2012) note, in such a case the delayed retirement credit of 8%
per annum will be better than actuarially fair for most people, thus embodying additional incentives to defer
retirement. To the extent this is true, the lump sums we compute are also better than actuarially fair with respect
to the 2.9% assumption.
8
See Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001), Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998), Battistin, Brugiavini, and
Weber (2009), and the discussion in Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011).
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Younger workers in their 20’s and 30’s work more than 40 hours per week. Individuals in
their 40’s (50’s) devote about 40 (35) hours per week to their jobs; after that, they sharply cut
back on average work hours and start to retire from full-time employment. 9 The third panel
reports asset allocation patterns by age. For those age 20-30, the bond fraction is 60%,
somewhat higher than found in empirical work. Yet from their 30’s onward, individuals hold
about 30-40% of their wealth in bonds, and 60-70% in stocks; these ratios are in line with
empirical evidence.10 Overall, our life cycle model is able to generate consumption, work, and
investment patterns that accord reasonably well with empirical evidence.
Figure 1 here
Next we examine how the two different delayed retirement schemes affect results in
the base case for individuals initially age 20 (left side of Figure 1) versus age 60 (right side).
Offering a lump sum Social Security instead of a larger benefit payment for deferred
retirement changes life cycle consumption, work hours, and investment patterns. For the
younger group, consumption and work hours do not respond much until they reach their 60’s.
At that point, those who will receive the lump sum can consume more and enjoy less leisure.
This occurs because the lump sum can spent as well as invested, potentially earning a market
return that permits more spending. Additionally, this higher consumption is traded off for less
leisure at older ages (more work hours). Overall, asset allocation under the two scenarios is
also quite similar, though after age 60, having the lump sum leads to a slightly higher equity
exposure and hence slightly lower bond fraction. Similarly, for those age 60 when the lump
sum is introduced, consumption and work hours increase, while bond holdings fall slightly.
Additional detail on retirement patterns is provided in Table 1, where young people –
knowing they will receive a lump sum for deferred retirement – shift rather markedly toward
later retirement. In fact, the left panel indicates that the average retirement age rises by 1.8

9

For more on this point see Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011).
See for example Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
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years (from 64.5 to 66.3); the probability of claiming benefits after the NRA rises from 29%
to 86%. Among those already age 60 when the lump sum scenario is implemented (right
panel), the average retirement age again rises though by a bit less, 1.4 years (from 63.5 to
64.9). While most older workers do claim benefits by age 68, their probability of working
beyond the NRA rises substantially, from 4% to 49%.11
Table 1 here
Sensitivity Analysis
Thus far, results for the base case provide support for the conclusion that providing a
lump sum instead of an increased annuity benefit for deferred retirement under Social
Security would induce people to work longer. Next, in sensitivity analyses presented in Table
2, we explore what happens when key preference parameters are changed. In addition, we
analyze the impact of two other potential changes in the Social Security rules, reported in
Panel A. Finally, Panel B illustrates the policy impacts on households who do not access the
equity market.
Table 2 here
Several alternative calibrations for preference parameters are provided in Table 2, to
be compared with the average retirement age results for the base case as well as the estimated
probability of working beyond the normal retirement age. Interestingly, workers with a
moderate versus a strong bequest motive (b = 2 or 5 in Panel A), compared to the base case
without bequests, behave relatively similarly when given a lump sum instead of a delayed
retirement annuity. Thus young workers seeking to leave a bequest would defer retirement by
1.9 years, on average, versus 1.8 if they had no interest in bequests; the older group would
boost its retirement age by 1.3 years versus 1.4 with no bequest motive. It is also worth noting
11

Table 1 shows two spikes in retirement frequency, at ages 63 and 66 (for the group initially age 20). These are
slightly later than the two retirement peaks at age 62 and 65 reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). Yet
that study denotes people as retired if they leave full-time work, while we assume that individuals claim
retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age. If we define retirement as working less than 20
hours per week, this would shift retirement rates earlier.
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that the probabilities of working beyond the NRA are comparable across the board. In sum,
even when workers have a bequest motive, the delayed retirement impact of the reform is
similar. Accordingly, providing a lump sum does not simply result in wealth transfers to one’s
heirs, consistent with the rationale for Social Security as a national social insurance scheme
intended to support consumption for the elderly.
The next six rows of Panel A in Table 2 illustrate how results change for lower/higher
subjective discount rates, lower/higher risk aversion, and lower/higher levels of tastes for
leisure versus consumption. Less patient younger and older workers (

0.96) will chose to

retire earlier as compared to the base case, but the lump sum reform still induces more to
work beyond the normal retirement age, and on average retirement ages rise. As discount
rates fall, those who are more patient (

0.99) will work longer than in the base case, with

an average increase of over one year in the retirement age; here too, the lump sum induces
later retirement. Turning next to differences by level of risk tolerance, older workers who are
not particularly risk averse (

2) will retire at the same age as in the base case. Yet offering

them the lump sum instead of the delayed annuity credit produces a much larger impact on
retirement ages: on average, the retirement age rises by 3.3 years compared to 1.3 in the base
case. A young household with low risk aversion retires 1.8 years earlier on average than the
base case household but delays retirement by a comparable 1.6 years in the lump sum regime.
Early retirement is also the norm for the extraordinarily risk averse (

8), under any of the

circumstances depicted. This is because such individuals tend to work very hard and save a
great deal at younger ages to protect against shocks; then, as they approach their 60’s, they
favor certain leisure and early retirement instead of worrying about not being able to consume
due to uncertain mortality. Additionally, offering them a lump sum has hardly any effect on
retirement behavior.
Next we turn to two alternative formulations for leisure preferences: one individual
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values consumption much more highly ( = 0.7) than in the base case, and the other values
leisure more ( = 1.9). Here, the lump sum reform has virtually no impact. That is, leisure
lovers still quit work early, and those who strongly prefer consumption still retire later since
longer worklives generate more spendable income.
The final two rows of Panel A in Table 2 examine the impact of two variations on
Social Security system parameters. Not surprisingly, if the Social Security benefit
replacement rate were reduced from λ = 60% to 45%, retirement ages rise substantially.
Those who have a lifetime to adjust, who are initially age 20, work 2.7 years longer, and the
older group works 3.3 more years. In both instances the probability of working over the NRA
exceeds 90%. This result obtains regardless of whether the delayed retirement credit is
replaced by the lump sum. In our second policy variant, we raise the NRA from 65 to 67 for
those initially age 20. This again would raise the average retirement age in the annuity regime,
but moving to the lump sum scenario would have hardly any additional impact on retirement
behavior.
If the aim is to raise retirement ages, the last two policies work in the same direction as
replacing the delayed retirement credit with a lump sum as described above. Yet cutting the
replacement rate and raising the NRA will be politically unpopular, since these represent
benefit reductions; offering the lump sum does not represent a benefit cut but a rather a
change in the timing of benefit receipt.
To this point, we have assumed that consumers have access to the equity market if
they wish to allocate their portfolios across risky and risk-free assets. Panel B illustrates
results if consumers do not access the equity market. This might be the case for people who
are not financially savvy due to lack of time, information, or the requisite guidance on how to
buy stock. We call this group the financially unsophisticated, consistent with van Rooij,
Lusardi and Alessie (2011) who show that those who lack financial literacy do not invest in
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the stock market. It is well known that some 50% of households do not participate in the stock
market today (SCF, 2012; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005); hence for this group, this second
set of results could be relevant.
Once again, we evaluate how retirement ages would change if the lump sum were
offered in lieu of the Social Security delayed benefit. The first row indicates that, in the base
case, both the young and the old would retire later than in Panel A. But giving workers a
lump sum for deferred retirement instead of an increased annuity would be less effective in
inducing prolonged work at older ages.
The second row of Panel B indicates that people who love risk (

2) worry less

about smoothing consumption, so for them the lump sum induces longer work and higher
consumption. By contrast, for extremely risk averse younger individuals (

8), the reform

has again the opposite incentive: they retire earlier and have a much lower probability of
working beyond the Normal Retirement Age. This can be explained by the fact that the
financially unsophisticated place a high value on the Social Security annuity as it allows them
to smooth consumption and also protects against longevity risk. These individuals cannot
replicate the benefit stream by investing the lump sum in the bond market. Evidently,
boosting Americans’ level of financial literacy would help strengthen the incentive effects of
a lump sum reform.

Welfare Implications
Finally we turn to an analysis of the welfare implications of replacing the delayed
retirement benefit with a lump sum. The approach evaluates how much additional wealth (as a
percent of first-year labor earnings) the individual would need under the current regime, to be
as well off as under the lump sum regime. Accordingly, a positive value implies the reform is
welfare enhancing, while a negative value implies the opposite.
Table 3 reports the results for various parameterizations of people initially age 20 and
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age 60 when the reform is implemented. In the base case, the change in welfare for the young
is miniscule (10 basis points). For those age 60 when the reform is implemented, the change
in lifetime utility is valued slightly positively, at 4%. Under alternative preference settings,
there is virtually no impact on the young – the welfare changes in all cases do not exceed -1%.
Moreover, the young financially unsophisticated also experience almost no change in utility,
with the exception of the very risk averse, where lifetime welfare declines by 10% of the
initial labor income.
Table 3 here
Turning to the older group (initially age 60), welfare impacts are all positive but
relatively small (below 5%) in most cases. One exception is for the risk-lover ( = 2) who has
access to the stock market. Here, the consumer’s welfare gains amount to a substantial 29%,
because she can trade off higher consumption levels early in retirement in exchange for lower
consumption later (when mortality risk increases). Moreover she has access to the equity
market and can invest part (or all) of the lump sum. The welfare gain is much lower (18%)
when the worker does not invest in the equity market.
For two groups of older individuals, welfare rises under the lump sum regime, but
there is little impact on retirement (see Table 2). Those with little taste for leisure ( = 0.7)
appreciate the lump sum but do not change work patterns as compared to the annuity regime;
this is because they are already willing to work a long time (up to age 70, in some cases) to
finance their high consumption needs. Their lengthy worklives generate high lump sum
payments for the delayed retirement credit, which in turn can be invested in the stock market
and used to boost consumption. The welfare gains of a lump sum payment compared to higher
annuity benefits disappears for 60-year old work lovers ( = 0.7) with no access to the stock
market.12
12

Such preferences for very long worklife may not be relevant for the broader population, but they would apply
to tenured university professors (Ashenfelter and Card, 2002).
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The retiree with a less generous replacement ratio (λ = 0.45) profits by receiving the
delayed retirement credit as a lump sum instead of a higher lifelong pension (welfare rises by
22.3%). Again, the reform has little impact on work effort, because in both cases the retiree is
willing to work longer to compensate the lower replacement rate. Rather the welfare
improvement results again from the possibility to invest the lump sum in the stock market.13
In general, the lump sum reform offers an incentive for people to trade off more
consumption for less leisure, by working longer and deferring retirement. Overall, this reform
has little impact on the young, relatively speaking, and it slightly enhances welfare among the
older population. Accordingly, such a reform could be an appealing alternative to encourage
longer worklives.

Conclusions
This paper has explored whether people might voluntarily work longer if they were
offered a lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. We adopt a
realistically calibrated life cycle model with forward looking rational agents with endogenous
labor supply, saving, investment, and retirement decisions, and allowing for time-varying
investment opportunity sets and risky labor income. This model generates consumption, work,
and investment profiles, relatively consistent with empirical evidence.
We show theoretically that substituting a lump sum for the delayed Social Security
annuity provides an incentive for many workers to voluntarily defer retirement, with little
reduction in lifetime welfare. In other words, giving workers a lump sum at their delayed
retirement date permits them to adjust the timing of their consumption and leisure time to
adapt their preferences. People who receive their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum
payment should optimally boost their average retirement age by 1.5-2 years. Having a lump
sum in lieu of a higher lifetime Social Security benefit allows retirees to shift consumption to
13

For consumers lacking access to the stock market, the welfare gain is positive but small (less than 2%).
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the earlier phase of retirement when mortality risk is low. In addition, the lump sum payment
permits households to participate in the stock market, seeking to earn the risk premium. These
results hold whether or not workers have a positive bequest motive, implying that the lump
sum does not simply result in wealth transfers to theirs. Households without access to the
equity market are less responsive to the lump sum option, but even here, the less risk-averse
also work longer and retire later, and the lump sum policy generally does not detract from
wellbeing.
In years to come, US policymakers will be actively seeking ways to reform Social
Security to restore the system to solvency. Proposing cuts in benefits tends to be quite
politically difficult. By contrast, offering a fair lump sum in place of the delayed retirement
annuity credit may be more politically attractive. By (voluntarily) delaying their retirement
date due to the lump sum option, workers would continue to pay Social Security payroll taxes
for more years, which could help return the system to solvency via additional payroll tax
collections. Moreover, such a policy could be designed to be cost-neutral, albeit in the real
world one would also need to consider additional issues including spouse and survivor
benefits, changes in annuity factors, sudden demands for liquidity due to health shocks, and
other factors. These are all avenues of future research.
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Appendix A: The Life Cycle Model
We build on the framework developed and calibrated by Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and
Rogalla (2012). Stock returns and labor earnings are driven by a Markov-Regime-Switching
process for the business cycle with two states: normal (st = 0), or contraction (st = 1). The
consumer observes the current state and knows the (constant) conditional transition probabilities

 iBC
, j : P( st 1  j | st  i ) to be at time t+1 in state j, given that at time t the economy is in state i.
Using US Gross National Product data, we estimate the transition probabilities between the two
BC
BC
BC
14
Capital markets include riskless bonds with
states as  0BC
, 0   0 , 0  0.68 and  0 , 0   0 , 0  0.32 .

gross return Rf = 1.02 and risky stocks. Log stock returns ln( Rs ,t 1 ) ~ N (  i ,  i ) are normally
distributed with state dependent parameters by either being in a normal capital market regime
with low volatility (σ0 = 11.21 percent) and high expected returns (µ0 = 6.84 percent), or a
contraction regime with high volatility (σ1 = 20.77 percent) and low expected returns (µ1 = 2.12
c
percent). Income on assets is taxed according to the proportional rate  , which we set to 20

percent.
The labor income process allows for unemployment risk and state-dependent wage rate
dynamics. The individual receives uncertain labor income depending on what fraction of
available time is devoted to work (1 - Lt) and a state dependent wage rate WRst ,t 1 . Earnings from
the labor market are reduced by an age-dependent fraction qt+1 of housing related expenditures,
estimated using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (or CES) as shown in Appendix B.
l
In addition, the worker must pay income taxes according to a proportional tax rate  equal to 30

percent. Thus disposable yearly labor earnings before the (endogenous) retirement age (t < τ,

 [62, 63,...,70] ) are given by:

14

As in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) a contraction (expansion) state occurs when the GNP growth rate
was less than (greater than) its sample period mean.
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YsE,t 1  (1  qt 1 )  1   l WRs ,t 1  1  Lt 

(A-1)

Here Lt = [1/3, 1] stands for leisure and is measured as a percentage of available time. To
transfer normalized leisure into work hours we assume 100 waking hours per week. The
exogenously- determined wage rate process is given by WRs ,t 1  expwt 1   Es ,t 1 U t 1. The
deterministic trend component wt 1 is calibrated using the earnings function reported in Fehr,
Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2006) for middle-income workers,15 and it is scaled to generate an
average gross labor income of $20,000 at age 20. ln(U t 1 ) ~ N (0,  u ) is a state-independent

transitory shock (  u = 32.9 percent), 16 and Es ,t 1  Es ,t ns ,t 1 is a state-dependent permanent labor
earnings component, with ln(ns ,t 1 ) ~ N (0,  n, s ). We follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004) and set the state dependent volatility  n,s of permanent wage rates shocks in the normal
state to  n ,0  8.4 percent which is lower than in the contraction scenario  n ,1  15.9 percent.
The correlation between stock returns and permanent and transitory earnings shocks  for both
cases is set to 0.2.
The worker could be unemployed in the next period, where the state-dependent
probability of unemployment  sU is again lower in the normal state (  0U = 5 percent) than in the
contraction state (  1U = 10 percent). In such a situation, the worker receives unemployment
compensation at time t + 1 specified as a set fraction of labor income, i.e., YsU,t 1  0.6  YsE,t 1.
The model allows a flexible retirement age, i.e. the worker can claim a Social Security
benefit payable for life at any age between the early retirement age (ERA = 62) and the latest
retirement age (LRA = 70). Once benefits are claimed, the individual does not return to the
workforce. If the worker claims prior to the normal retirement age (NRA = 65), the benefits are
15

Precisely we use equation (9) with parameter =0 which produces a humped shaped trend function for wages
rates: w(age)=exp(4.47+0.033*age–0.00067*age2).
16
The volatility of the transitory shock is estimated by averaging the fixed effect and measurement error from
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
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permanently reduced for each year of early retirement according to the reduction factor g1 =
0.0713. If the individual works longer than the NRA, the Social Security benefit is increased per
year of additional work by the delayed retirement credit g2 = 0.077 (see Buchinsky, Rust, and
Benitez-Silva 2000). To capture this feature, we calculate the after-tax Social Security benefits as
in Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011):





Yt  (1  qt ) 1   r Y  F , NRA ,
where is

∙

exp

,

exp

(A-2)
∙

a factor

which specifies the reduction/increase of retirement benefits if the individual retires prior/later to
the NRA. The parameter λ is the Social Security replacement rate (here set to 60 percent as in
Mitchell and Phillips 2006) based on the worker’s lifetime average earnings approximated by
∑

1

exp

/

retirement age (NRA) and 1

∙

. Here K denotes when the individual attains the normal

stands for the average working time until retirement, which we

set equal to 0.4 corresponding to a lifetime work effort of 40 hours per week on average. As in
Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) Social Security benefits are taxed at a proportional rate of

 r  15 percent.
Alternatively, we posit that the individual can receive the delayed Social Security
retirement benefit as a lump sum payment, instead of an increase in lifelong annuity benefits. In
this case, the lump sum payment is calculated as the actuarial present value of the additional
annuity benefits generated by working longer than the normal retirement age. Formally the lump
sum payment is given (t > NRA) as follows:

LSt  (1   r )  Y  ( F , NRA  1)  ät
Here

1

∑

∏

∙

(A-3)

is the actuarial present value factor based on the

riskless interest rate Rf and the one year survival probabilities pt (i.e. to survive to time t+1 given
being alive at t).
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The following table illustrates the possible lump sum payments for delaying retirement as
percentage of benefits at age 65 (ceteribus paribus). To calculate them, we use a riskless interest
rate of 2% per annum (as in our life cycle model) and the US 2000 population mortality table for
females. Further we normalize the lump sum payments given in equation (A-3) by (1   r )Y  . In
addition we report the delayed retirement credits F , NRA if the worker receives the additional
benefits as a lifelong annuity.
Retirement Age
66
67
68
Life Annuity (in % of NRA benefit) 8.0
Lump Sum (in % of NRA benefit) 119.0

16.6
239.2

26.0
360.0

69

70

36.1
481.1

46.9
602.9

Each period, the consumer decides how much to work (1 - Lt) to generate labor income,
when to retire, and how to allocate cash on hand Wt to bonds Bt, stocks St, and consumption Ct.
The budget constraint is given by:

Wt  St  Bt  Ct ,

(A-4)

and next period’s wealth Wt+1 is described by:

Wt 1  ( St Rs ,t 1  Bt R f )(1   c )   c ( Bt  St )  Ys ,t 1

(A-5)

Here, Ys,t is labor income as defined in equations (A-1) and (A-2). This is the state-dependent net
labor income (or unemployment benefits) prior to claiming and the Social Security benefits after
claiming. In case the household claims after the NRA, the delayed retirement credit is paid in
form of a lump sum, and

in equation (A-2) is set to zero when calculating the lifelong benefits

from Social Security. In this situation, the wealth transition equation at the time of claiming, ̅, is
given by:

Wt 1  ( St Rs ,t 1  Bt R f )(1   c )   c ( Bt  St )  Ys ,t 1  LSt 1

(A-6)

Here LSt is the lump sum payment according to equation (A-3) the household receives at time

̅

1. In subsequent periods (

̅), the transition equation is again given by (A-5).
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Households cannot borrow against human capital nor can they hold short positions in
stocks and bonds (Ct, St, Bt, ≥ 0). Moreover, we posit that in order to participate in the stock
market, the household has to be willing and able to invest a minimum amount in stocks (as in
Smetters and Chen, 2010). This amount is set to 50% of permanent labor income.
The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize lifetime utility with respect to
her asset allocation between bonds and stocks, consumption, work hours, and the retirement
decision. After normalizing with permanent labor income there are four state variables: cash on
hand Wt, retirement age τ, the business cycle state s, and age t. We discretize the (normalized)
continuous state variable and solve the optimization problem by backward induction. For
computations, we use a grid of dimension 40(W) × 2(s) × 42(t) before and 40(W) × 2(s) × 39(t)
× 9() after the ERA. For each grid point we evaluate the policy and value functions using
Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic-splines interpolation.
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Appendix B. Construction of Housing-related Expenditure to Income Ratios
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (or CES) is collected by the U.S. Federal
government through the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the purpose of providing a complete
range of information on consumer expenditures and income. The survey consists of five
interviews on a quarterly basis. At the initial interview, each household must complete a
consumption diary over a 2-week span and provide a detailed overview of what it consumes
on a daily basis. The subsequent four interviews focus on quarterly expenditures and annual
income; expenditures on housing in the current quarter we multiply by four to obtain annual
housing expenditures. Our dataset spans the time period 1996 to 2010 and represents a panel
over one-period horizons, but different households are interviewed on a year-to-year basis. In
total, there were 425,672 interviews of 145,203 unique households over the 15-year period.
We consider only households where the head is between ages 20-89; we omit observations
with negative housing expenditures or labor income. In addition, any observation with a
housing-expenditure-to-labor-income ratio exceeding one is excluded from the analysis. This
leaves 116,015 households and 161,050 yearly observations.
The variables of interest relate to housing expenditures and labor income to generate a
ratio of ‘Housing Expenditure over Labor Income.’ We sought to fit this measure as closely
as possible to the specification reported in Gomes and Michaelides (2005). We define annual
labor income as FINCBTAX-(INTEARNX+FININCX), described as ‘Income before taxes’
less ‘income from savings and bonds’ and ‘income from dividends, royalties, etc.’17
Quarterly housing expenditures are estimated as the sum of the variables HOUSCQ and
HOUSPQ, and this we multiply by four to obtain annual housing expenditures. The last
pertinent variable for analysis is the age of the reference person, which is AGE.

17

One might ask why we do not use the income after taxes (FINCATAX). We discovered that, for some
households reporting an income of zero (FINCBTAX=0), they still had to pay some taxes so the after-tax income
was negative. This poses a problem for computing the ratio of Housing Expenditures to Labor Income.
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Next we run a regression of the ratio of housing expenditures to labor income (qi,t) on
age polynomials and an economy dummy. The ratios are computed for each household by
taking housing expenditures (mortgage/rent payments, utilities, and housing-related durable
expenditures) relative to the before-tax labor income and regressed against a cubic
polynomial of age (of the head of the household), and a dummy variable representing an
economy that is either normal (=0) or contracting (=1). The regression is as follows:

∗

∗

∗

∗

Results of this regression analysis are summarized in the following table:

Constant
Age
Age2
Age3
Economy
No. of Observations
R‐Squared

Coefficient
0.5773585
‐0.0132081
0.0001793
‐5.72E‐07
0.0016453

t‐Statistic
49.51
‐17.57
11.83
‐5.97
1.61

Standard Errors
0.011661
0.000752
0.000015
0.000000
0.001022
161,050
0.021

Our results are compatible with observed rates of higher housing spending especially at older
ages, unlike Gomes and Michaelides (2005) who assume that housing expenditures are zero
over age 80.
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Figure 1: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on
Consumption, Work Hours, and Investments among the Financially Sophisticated
Age 20

Age 60

Notes: Expected life cycle profiles for financially sophisticated households with access to the
stock market. Annuity: Delayed retirement benefits are paid as a lifelong increase of the
pension annuity. Lump Sum: Delayed retirement benefits are paid as an actuarially fair onetime lump sum at retirement. Consumption at various ages reported in USD thousands. Work
hours and bond fraction reported as average for different age groups. Base case calibration:
relative risk aversion
5, bequest motive strength
0, time preference
0.97, leisure
preference
1.3, normal retirement age
65, early retirement age
62, latest
retirement age
70, Social Security replacement rate
0.6. Source: Authors’
calculations.
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Table 1: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on
Retirement Age: Base Case
Age 20
Age 60
Age
Annuity Lump Sum
Annuity Lump Sum
14.7
8.1
62
1.7
1.0
36.9
22.1
63
30.8
5.6
37.2
17.2
64
26.9
4.1
7.0
3.5
65
11.7
3.0
3.7
29.1
66
19.3
46.9
0.4
14.8
67
7.1
20.0
0.1
5.2
68
2.3
19.4
0.0
0.0
69
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
70
0.1
0.0
63.5
64.9
64.5
66.3
Av. Ret. Age
4.2
49.1
28.9
86.3
P(RA>NRA)
Notes: Simulated distribution of retirement ages (frequency in %) for the base case. Assumed
parameters: relative risk aversion
5, bequest motive strength
0, time preference
0.97, leisure preference
1.3, normal retirement age
65, early retirement age
62, latest retirement age
70, Social Security replacement rate
0.6;
financially sophisticated households with access to the stock market. Annuity: delayed
retirement benefits are paid as a lifelong increase of the pension annuity. Lump Sum: delayed
retirement benefits are paid as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement.
P(RA>NRA): simulated frequency (in %) of retirement after the normal retirement age.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2: Impact of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed Retirement on Retirement Age: Alternative Calibrations
Annuity
Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA)

Age 20
Lump Sum
Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA)

Annuity
Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA)

Age 60
Lump Sum
Av. Ret. Age P(RA>NRA)

A. Financially Sophisticated
Base Case
64.5
Alternative Household Preferences
64.3
2
64.3
5
64.0
0.96
65.4
0.99
62.7
2
63.0
8
68.8
0.7
62.6
1.9
Alternative Retirement System Parameters
67.2
0.45
67 (for age 20)
65.3
B. Financially Unsophisticated
Base Case
67.0
=2
65.1
=8
64.2

0.289

66.3

0.863

63.5

0.042

64.9

0.491

0.235
0.240
0.172
0.536
0.001
0.028
0.955
0.007

66.2
66.2
65.2
66.4
64.3
62.9
68.3
62.7

0.859
0.844
0.541
0.887
0.351
0.002
0.934
0.016

63.3
63.3
63.2
64.0
63.6
62.5
68.1
62.5

0.022
0.023
0.013
0.136
0.014
0.000
0.993
0.000

64.6
64.4
63.9
65.7
66.9
62.5
68.3
62.5

0.460
0.409
0.254
0.738
0.935
0.000
0.995
0.002

0.927
0.068

67.3
65.6

0.927
0.187

66.8
na

0.976
na

67.4
na

0.990
na

0.898
0.587
0.257

66.7
67.2
63.7

0.963
0.969
0.091

63.9
64.9
62.7

0.092
0.267
0.001

64.0
66.2
62.7

0.186
0.882
0.000

Notes: Panel A (B) refers to simulated retirement patterns of households with (without) access to the stock market. P(RA>NRA): simulated
frequency of retirement ages (RA) older than the normal retirement age (NRA). Annuity: delayed retirement credit paid as increase in Social
Security lifetime benefit. Lump Sum: delayed retirement credit paid as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement. For base case parameters
see Table 1. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 3: Welfare Implications of Lump Sum vs. Annuity Reward for Delayed
Retirement
Age 20
Age 60
A. Financially Sophisticated
Base Case
‐0.001
0.041
Alternative Household Preferences
‐0.001
2
‐0.001
5
0.000
0.96
‐0.005
0.99
0.000
2
‐0.006
8
‐0.008
0.7
‐0.001
1.9

0.043
0.042
0.028
0.078
0.289
0.000
0.343
0.000

Alternative Retirement System Parameters
‐0.005
0.45
‐0.001
67

0.223
na

B. Financially Unsophisticated
Base Case
2
8

0.008
0.177
0.000

‐0.020
0.000
‐0.101

Notes: Welfare increases (in multiples of labor income as of age 20/60) from paying the
delayed retirement credit as an actuarially fair one-time lump sum at retirement instead of an
increase in the Social Security lifetime benefit. Base case calibration: relative risk aversion
5, bequest motive strength
0, time preference
0.97, leisure preference
1.3,
normal retirement age
65, early retirement age
62, latest retirement age
70, Social Security replacement rate
0.6. Source: Authors’ calculations.

